One of the most pressing questions concerning singular demonstrative mental contents is what makes their content singular: that is to say, what makes it the case that individual objects are the representata of these mental states. Many philosophers have required sophisticated intellectual capacities for singular content to be possible, such as the possession of an elaborate scheme of space and time. A more recent reaction to this strategy proposes to account for singular content solely on the basis of empirical models (...) of visual processing. We believe both sides make good points, and offer an intermediate way of looking into singular content. Our suggestion is that singular content may be traced to psychological capacities to form flexible, abstract representations in the prefrontal cortex. This allows them to be sustained for increasingly longer periods of time and extrapolated beyond the context of perception, thus going beyond lowlevel sensory representations while also falling short of more sophisticated intellectual abilities. (shrink)

In The Deep History of Ourselves, Joseph LeDoux distinguishes between behavioral and physiological responses caused by the activation of defense circuits, and the emotion of fear. Although the former is found in nearly all bilateral animals, the latter is supposedly a unique human adaptation that requires language, reflective self-awareness, among other cognitive capacities. In this picture, fear is an autonoetic conscious experience that happens when defense circuit activation is integrated into self-awareness and the experience labeled with the “fear” concept. In (...) this commentary I will propose a different view, in which fear is a skillful activity that we coordinate with others as our social interactions unfold in time. If this is true, two important conclusions will follow. Firstly, the relevant brain circuits we should be looking for in our theory of emotions are those involved in affective social learning, social cognition, embodied intersubjectivity, and so on. Secondly, emotions may not be uniquely human, and may be present in any creature with the right kinds of social skills required for affective enactments. Therefore, although LeDoux is right to hold that emotions are not as deep as defense circuits, they are not as shallow as other cognitively sophisticated human capacities. (shrink)

In our everyday interactions we easily and effortlessly perceive emotions in others’ facial expressions and bodily behavior. How do we do that? Philosophers and psychologists have long argued about the fundamentals of emotion perception and the debate is far from settled. While some insist on the sufficiency of the morphological information contained in facial expressions, others construe the objects of emotion perception as more complex, comprising multimodal information such as touch, tone of voice, body postures, and so on. Others, in (...) turn, have gone so far as to deny that there is a pre-given object in emotion perception in the first place, so that processes of emotion perception must be conceptualized as emergent and co-constructed phenomena in contexts of social interaction. The purpose of this paper is to argue that John Dewey’s pragmatist theory of emotions can help us make significant theoretical advancements in the understanding of emotion perception, according to which emotions are coordinated modes of behavior that we enact with others in the contexts of social interactions. In this picture, perceiving emotions is a matter of participating in a joint activity of socio- affective coordination. This theory allows us to apprehend important insights about emotion perception that appear in these contemporary debates, while at the same time avoiding their pitfalls. (shrink)

What is it like to perceive a feared object? According to a popular neo-Gibsonian theory in psychology, fear biases our perceptions of objects so as to encourage particular kinds of actions: when we are afraid, spiders may be perceived as physically closer than they are in order to promote fleeing. Firestone mounted severe criticisms against this view, arguing that these cases are better explained by non-perceptual biases that operate on accurate perceptions of the external environment. In this paper I will (...) argue that fear might indeed distort our perceptions of the world, but not in the way neo-Gibsonians suppose. In the view I favor, perceptual distortions occur as by-products of fearful attention, a special mode of attention that is part of an orchestrated defensive response that prepares the organism to deal effectively with a threat. To argue for this view I will rely on empirical evidence that fearful attention narrows down the focus of attention and favors processing of local rather than global features of stimuli, which may jointly explain why perceptual distortions might occur in fearful object seeing. This view has consequences not only for empirical investigations in fearful perceptual distortions, but also for an explanation of the intentionality of fear and the phenomenal integration of bodily and intentional elements in fear episodes. (shrink)

In this paper, we defend that demonstratives are expressions of joint attention. Though this idea is not exactly new in the philosophical or linguistic literature, we argue here that their proponents have not yet shown how to incorporate these observations into more traditional theories of demonstratives. Our purpose is then to attempt to fill this gap. We argue that coordinated attentional activities are better integrated into a full account of demonstratives as meta-pragmatic information. Our claim is twofold. First, we claim (...) that pragmatically presupposing salience is a fundamental aspect of using demonstratives. Secondly, we hold that the pragmatics of demonstrating can only be properly understood in relation to meta-pragmatic conditions that have to do with joint attention. We use tests of truth-value gap as evidence for our claim. Our proposal provides us with a complete view of what speakers do and presuppose when engaging in acts of demonstrative reference through language. (shrink)

Durante as últimas décadas, pesquisas empíricas em psicologia social têm mostrado uma influência significativa de vieses implícitos sobre o modo como pessoas negras são percebidas e categorizadas. Ainda não é claro, no entanto, que a mesma metodologia possa ser empregada para aferir a presença de vieses implícitos na percepção espacial. O objetivo deste artigo será argumentar que a percepção do espaço é também racialmente enviesada, embora não no mesmo sentido pressuposto por grande parte da psicologia empírica. De acordo com a (...) presente proposta, vieses implícitos serão entendidos como hábitos perceptuais corporificados. Tais hábitos são moldados por categorias raciais e podem tomar a forma do que chamaremos de “expansividade branca”, em que o espaço é percebido em termos de expansão e permissibilidade. Essa permissibilidade, no entanto, é uma marca de privilégio e não de competência, constituindo-se em uma percepção racialmente enviesada do espaço. Confrontar a racialidade implícita desses espaços demanda o que o filósofo George Yancy chama de “de-suturação”, uma abertura afetiva e epistêmica que expõe a ilusão de neutralidade do espaço e a reconceitualiza como opressora para os não-brancos que ocupam esses mesmos espaços. (shrink)

O objetivo do presente volume é apresentar à comunidade filosófica parte do trabalho realizado nos GTs de Filosofia da Libertação, Latino-americana e Africana e Filosofia e Raça durante o XIX Encontro Nacional da ANPOF (Goiânia, 2022), através de textos apresentados no XIX Encontro Nacional da ANPOF (Goiânia, 2022), ou frutos de discussões e debates realizados nos GTs supracitados. Agradecemos a todos, todas e todes que apresentaram seus trabalhos e/ou participaram ativamente das discussões que deram origem aos textos deste volume, enriquecendo (...) o debate filosófico e conferindo maior visibilidade e destaque a esses tópicos de pesquisa em nossa comunidade. -/- Os temas abordados e as bases epistemológicas do GT Filosofia da Libertação, Latino-americana e Africana e do GT Filosofia e Raça apresentam vários pontos de contato. Isso justifica esta publicação conjunta, que certamente incentivará a continuidade do diálogo entre os GTs e possibilitará a formação futura de novas agendas de pesquisa. As leitoras e os leitores deste livro têm a oportunidade de conhecer alguns dos trabalhos realizados pelos dois grupos e estão convidadas e convidados a participar das atividades realizadas pelos GTs. (shrink)